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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DISCLOSURE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Rose v. Department of the Air Force
The Freedom of Information Actl (FOIA) represents the culmi-
nation of extensive congressional efforts2 to foster meaningful public
scrutiny of federal agency action.3 Founded upon the premise that an
informed electorate is essential to democratic self-government, 4 the
Act seeks to provide meaningful access to Government documents and
materials." Accordingly, the FOIA creates a right in the general public
15 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as FOIA]. See generally Davis, The
Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 761 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Davis]; Note, The Freedom of Information Act: Shredding the Paper Curtain, 47 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 694 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Shredding the Paper Curtain].
2According to then Congressman Donald Rumsfeld, the FOIA "was the result of a
12-year effort on the part of press, the Bar and the Congress to begin to deal with
decades of unwarranted secrecy in the Executive Branch of the Federal government."
Rumsfeld, FOI Cleanup Hitters with Good Followthrough, Am. Soc'Y oF NwvsPAPER
EDrroRs BULL., reprinted in 114 CONG. Rac. 3774, 3775 (1968). See also Frankel v. SEC,
460 F.2d 813, 815-17 (2d Cir. 1972).
See Hearings on the Administration and Operation of the Freedom of Information
Act Before 'the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, 1367-73 (1972). The
legislative deliberations prior to enactment are discussed in detail in Note, Comments on
Proposed Amendments to Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom
of Information Bill, 40 NoRE DAMiE LAW. 417 (1965).
8H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.],
quoted in Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 658 (6th Cir. 1972). The
court in Tennessean noted:
One of the reasons for the First Amendment as well as the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, is to promote honesty of government by seeing to it that public busi-
ness functions under the hard light of full public scrutiny.
Id. at 660.4 1n Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court indicated that the
FOIA Was enacted to provide citizens with access to governmental papers, since
Congress recognized that the public cannot make intelligent decisions without
such information, and that governmental institutions become unresponsive to
public needs if knowledge of their activities is denied to the people and their
representatives.
Id. at 1080. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 936 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 824 (1970).
James Madison once noted that "[k]nowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a
people who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power
kn iwledge gives." Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, reprinted in 9 TBE WIT-
imes or JAwMEs M"isoN 103 (Hunt ed. 1910). This language was adopted by the Senate
in its report of the FOIA. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as C. REP.].
5 The Second Circuit has stated:
The ultimate purpose [of the FOIA] was to enable the public to have sufficient
information in order to be able, through the electoral process, to make intelli-
gent, informed choices with resnect to the nature, scope, and procedure of federal
government activities.
Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972) (Hays, J.).
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to obtain agency information and requires that identifiable agency
records be promptly made available to any person upon request.0
This newly created public right is not, however, without limi-
tation. Although the basic purpose of the FOIA is to increase the
quantity and liberalize the scope of disclosure, 7 Congress has refused
to extend the applicability of the Act to nine separate categories of
information.8 Among the matters specifically excluded from FOIA
coverage are personnel or medical files, whose release would result
in a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," and docu-
ments pertaining only to the agency's personnel rules and practices.10
In Rose v. Department of the Air Force,1 the Second Circuit was
presented with an opportunity to interpret the mandates of the FOIA.
Michael T. Rose, a member of the New York University Law Review
and an Air Force Academy graduate, sought access to the case sum-
maries of the Academy's honor and ethics code disciplinary proceed-
ings.- 2 He intended to utilize these summaries in connection with a
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970); see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (White, J.) (the
Act "attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure . .. information
from possibly unwilling official hands"); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D. DeL
1972).
7See, e.g., Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 700-01 (5th Cir. 1973); Bristol-Myers Co.
v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 936 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); UNrn STATES
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SEC-
TION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT, at III-IV (1967). See also S. REP., supra note
4, at 3; H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 1.
8 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) provides:
This section does not apply to matters that are -
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a per-
son and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with an
agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the ex-
tent available by law to a party other than an agency;(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports pre-
pared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regu-
lation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concern-
ing wells.
9d. § 552(b)(6).
lOId. § 552(b)(2).
11495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3445 (U.S. Feb. 14, 1975) (No.
74-489).
12 Id. at 262. The sought-after documents were to be utilized as reference material.
The summaries are excerpts of the significant facts in each honor committee case and
some of the important cases decided by the more informal ethics committee. Id. at 266.
Approximately 100 to 200 summaries were involved. Id. at 268 n.19.
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Law Review article dealing with disciplinary systems at the service
academies. Upon the refusal of the Air Force to order their release,13
Rose brought an action in the federal district court to compel dis-
closure of the documents with personal references and identifying
information excised.14 The district court refused Rose's requests, find-
ing the summaries to pertain exclusively to internal personnel rules
of the agency.15 On appeal, the Second Circuit, over a vigorous dissent
by Judge Moore, reversed, holding that the summaries, if properly re-
dacted to meet the demands of the privacy exemption,' could be dis-
closed pursuant to the FOIA.1'7 The court further ruled that the
summaries were not within the internal personnel rules exemption'8
and that the judiciary had no general equitable power to preclude
release of documents whose disclosure was mandated by the FOIA.19
The Rose court was initially confronted with the always difficult
problem of evaluating conflicting substantial rights, a difficulty com-
13 Rose's request was formally denied three times, the final denial coming from the
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Brief for Appellants at 5-6. The case is illustra-
tive of the difficulty and expense involved, despite the FOIA, in securing information
from a reluctant Government agency. See generally Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play:
Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEXAs L. REv. 1261 (1970);
Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEo. L.J. 18 (1967).
For a discussion of the administrative steps a plaintiff might be required to take
prior to bringing an action under the FOIA in order to avoid being defeated by the
doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, see Shredding the Paper Curtain, supra note 1, at
703-06. Accord, Nader, Freedom From Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARv.
Civ. RMiorrs-Civ. Lm. L. R-v. 1, 5 (1970). But see Note, The Information Act: Judicial
Enforcement of the Records Provision, 54 VA. L. REv. 466, 468-71 (1968) (generally sup-
porting the proposition that merely a reasonable effort is required to support an FOIA
action).
14 The FOIA provides that if an improper withholding of documents occurs, a fed-
eral district court may, upon complaint, enjoin the further withholding of the papers
and order the Government to produce the documents in court. The district court is to
try the case de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its position. 5 US.C.
§ 552(a)(3) (1970).
In his FOIA action, Rose was joined by the present and former editors-in-chief of
the New York University Law Review. Throughout the proceedings, the Review em-
phasized that it was willing to accept the case summaries with the names of the accused
cadets and other identifying information deleted. By doing so, the Review relied heavily
upon the principle established in Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp. v. Renegotiation Board,
425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970), wherein the court held:
The statutory history does not indicate, however, that Congress intended to ex-
empt an entire document merely because it contained some [exempt] ... infor-
mation. . . . Mhe interests of confidentiality can be protected by striking
identifying details prior to releasing the document.
Id. at 580-81 (footnotes omitted). See Brief for the Appellants at 26.
15 495 F.2d at 263. This ground was raised by the trial court sua sponte.
10 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
17495 F.2d at 268-69. Circuit Judges Feinberg and Hays constituted the majority,
with Judge Feinberg authoring the court's opinion.
18 Id. at 266.
19 Id. at 269-70.
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pounded in this instance by lack of adequate congressional guidance. 20
Through enactment of the FOIA, Congress attempted to strike a bal-
ance between the general public's right of access to government docu-
ments and the individual's right to privacy.21 Since the FOIA places
the burden of proof on the agency to justify nondisclosure,22 the re-
lease of information to the public appears favored. Furthermore, courts
have encouraged disclosure by repeatedly holding that the FOIA's
exemptions are to be narrowly construed.2 3 Additionally, in this par-
ticular instance, the Air Force allowed access to the summaries to
Academy cadets and others with a "need to know."24 The court stated
that "the curtain of confidentiality appears to shield these records
from the glare of external publicity but not from the eyes of present
[and future] cadets." 25
Among the considerations militating against disclosure, both the
House of Representatives and the Senate recognized that many federal
agencies maintained massive files containing detailed, intimate per-
sonal information.20 Revelation of such materials could result in harm
and embarrassment to individuals which could not be justified by a
legitimate public interest. Accordingly, the Second Circuit realized
that disclosure of a disciplined cadet's identity could result in serious
damage to his livelihood and reputation.27 The majority was partic-
ularly concerned that the rights of the affected cadets be adequately
protected since neither party to the action had the interest of the
cadets directly at heart.28 In light of the internal dissemination of the
20 A major flaw of the FOIA is the equivocal nature of its draftsmanship. See Davis,
supra note 1, at 807-09; Shredding the Paper Curtain, supra note 1, at 697. See also
Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1973, 1974 DuxE L.J.
251, 252, 275-77 nn.140-46, 281 & n.167, 283 & nn.176-80. As the Rose court itself noted:
"As is frequently the case with such legislation, we have little to guide us in the way of
precedent, and the brevity and generality of the statutory formulations leave much to be
decided by the courts." 495 F.2d at 262.
21 S. REP., supra note 4, at 9; H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 11. See Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
225 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
28 See Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F2d 699, 700-01 (5th Cir. 1973); Bannercaft Clothing
Co. v. Renegotiation Board, 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Weilford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d
21 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 936 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970).
24495 F.2d at 266. Although information about disciplinary cases is to be kept
strictly confidential, the case summaries are posted in the Academy's squadrons and
Honor Representatives are permitted to discuss the cases with the cadets. In fact, the
names of dismissed cadets are not deleted from the summaries. However, the name of a
guilty cadet who is allowed to remain at the Academy will not be released. Id.
25 Id.
26 S. REP., supra note 4, at 9; H.R. RP., supra note 3, at 11.
27 495 F.2d at 267. Among the possible consequences considered by the court were
loss of employment and friends. Id.
28 Id. Although the Air Force was seeking to prevent disclosure, it was acting pri-
marily to defend its own procedures rather than to protect the interests of the cadets.
[Vol. 49:225
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summaries by the Air Force, mere deletion of names would not pre-
serve the privacy interests of the disciplined cadets. Since old recol-
lections could be refreshed by reading the fact patterns,29 such a
procedure could pose a "great risk" to the cadets and effectuate an un-
warranted interference with their right to privacy. 0
Having considered the arguments for disclosure and the risks
inherent therein, the majority of the Second Circuit panel resolved
the conflict by remanding the case for an in camera examination of
the documents by the district court."1 In so doing, the procedures to
be utilized in the lower court's review were set forth. Judge Feinberg,
writing for the majority, ordered the Air Force to produce the docu-
ments and to work with the trial court in their redaction. The judge
felt that a "workable compromise" could be reached and useful, albeit
edited, documents handed over to the Law Review.8 2 The court indi-
cated, however, that should the removal of all personal references and
identifying information prove insufficient to safeguard the privacy of
the cadets, the documents should not be released.83
In reaching its decision, the Rose majority properly declined to
consider the status and needs of those demanding access to the docu-
ments. The court focused instead on achieving a proper balance be-
tween the privacy rights of the disciplined cadets and the rights of
the general public to information as guaranteed by the FOIA.84 This
approach appears consonant with the Act's language and legislative
history. The Act authorizes "any person" to request documents and,
upon agency failure to produce the materials, to institute suit.85 In-
29By having his memory prompted through the reading of a summary or a refer-
ence thereto, an Air Force officer, graduated from the Academy, might come to realize
that a man under his command had been subjected to Academy discipline. Id.
80 Id. at 268. The court pointed out that there is no guarantee that officers who have
had access to the documents will maintain the secrecy of the material's contents, espe-
dally "when time may have eroded the fabric of cadet loyalty." Id. at 267.
There is a more compelling reason, however, why the interests of the disciplined
cadets must be adequately protected. Neither the statute nor the legislative history places
any limits on the possible uses of information obtained through the FOIA. Similarly,
there is no prohibition against, or limitation on, the further dissemination of the docu-
ments. City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Thus, once
the Review had obtained the case summaries, it could treat them as the editors pleased,
including publishing the summaries in whole or in part.
31495 F.2d at 268. The court noted that since the agency had failed to meet its bur-
den under the FOIA, see note 14 supra, the Air Force must now produce the documents
in court.
82 495 F.2d at 268.
3Id. In light of the court's stress on the production of "documents sufficient for the
purpose sought," id., and of the concern expressed for the privacy of the disciplined
cadets, it may be hypothesized that should the documents require such heavy editing as
to render them valueless, these papers likewise should not be released.
34 Id. at 268-69.
855 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
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deed, one of the principal reforms effected by the FOIA was elimi-
nation of the "properly and directly concerned" test of the former
statute.86 The new Act does not create rights running to particular
individuals or groups but rather, entitles the general public to obtain
more information about its Government.31 In the words of Justice
White:
[The Act] seeks to permit access to official information long
shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create
a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information
from possibly unwilling official hands.38
Consequently, disclosure is to be promoted, in part, by discouraging
agencies from resisting requests based upon the demandant's purported
lack of status or absence of need to know.89
In his dissent, Judge Moore took issue with the majority's reso-
lution of the privacy issue as well as their failure to consider the status
of the demandant. He contended that even the disclosure of redacted
summaries would result in an "egregious" intrusion into the cadets'
privacy rights.40 Furthermore, a breach of secrecy enveloping cadet
disciplinary hearings could not be justified by "the curiosity satisfying
efforts of three law school students, who merely to write a Law Review
Note would pry into and seek to disclose the former transgressions of
Air Force cadets." 41 Additionally, Judge Moore stated that elimination
of the identifiable factual elements would only create hypotheticals,
thus failing to provide the raw factual data sought by the Review. 2
In any event, the dissent argued, the entire in camera process would
constitute an extreme and unjustifiable misuse of judicial time and
expense.4 Notwithstanding the arguments of Judge Moore, the Rose
36 See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973), quoting 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964); Robles
v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 84647 (4th Cir. 1973).
37 See S. REP., supra note 4, at 3; H.P. REP., supra note 3, at 1.
88 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
39 Despite the intent to promote disclosure, litigants seeking such relief may be dis-
couraged by the lengthy delays in the adjudication of FOIA claims. In spite of the fact
that the FOIA specifically provides that actions under the Act are to take precedence
over other actions and are to be expedited, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), extensive delays
between the demandant's original request and final adjudication are common. In Get-
man v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971), for example, almost two years elapsed be-
tween the original request and the ultimate decision. Rose, without considering the time
that will be required in the editing and in camera review process, has involved a time
span of almost three years.
40 495 F.2d at 265.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 272.
43 Id. In expressing his view, Judge Moore stated:
In these days when there is so much clamor about the desirability of speedy
trials, I am unwilling to subscribe to, or acquiesce in, any opinion which saddles
[Vol. 49:225
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majority, in requiring the in camera examination, has remained faith-
ful to the congressional goal of achieving the maximum degree of
disclosure possible without doing violence to other important societal
values. The examination and redaction would adequately protect the
rights of disciplined cadets to have their privacy respected.44 Moreover,
the Air Force would not be permitted to cast an opaque cloak of
secrecy over its honor code proceedings. Although the use of an in
camera examination would not be appropriate in all FOIA cases, the
propriety of its use in a Rose situation appears clear.45 Use of such
such a needless burden upon an important branch of our military forces and, in
my opinion, an equally important judicial branch.
Id. Judge Moore estimated that it would take about 25 hours to delete the names from
150 case summaries and at least 75 hours to do a more careful editing. Id.; see note 12
supra.
44The majority did not share the dissenter's prediction that the editing process
would involve a substantial amount of judicial time. See note 43 and accompanying text
supra. The court indicated that once agreement was reached on the basic principles to
be applied, the actual editing would not take an "undue amount of time." 495 F.2d at
269 n.21.
Assuming that a large amount of judicial time is involved, the problem can be al-
leviated by permitting the district court to appoint a special master. This approach has
been adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086,
1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (wherein the court noted that appointing a master may "relieve
much of the burden of evaluating documents that currently falls on the trial judge';
accord, Tax Analysts 8. Advocates v. IRS, 562 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (D.D.C. 1973).
The District of Columbia has been the forum for many FOIA cases since the statute
grants jurisdiction to the court in the district wherein the plaintiff resides or has his
principal place of business or where the agency records are situated. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)
(1970).
45 Whether the use of an in camera examination is proper may depend upon which
statutory exemption is at issue in a given case. In EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), the
Supreme Court ruled that an in camera examination is not permitted pursuant to ex-
emption one (military or diplomatic secrets), but may be appropriate in an exemption
five case (interagency memoranda not available to nonagency parties in litigation with
the agency). Id. at 84, 93. But see note 80 inIra. Where exemption five is at issue, the Court
ruled that the agency should be given an opportunity to establish, by detailed affidavits
or oral testimony, that the exemption clearly applies. Alternatively, the agency may pro-
duce a representative document for the court's consideration in camera. Id. at 93.
Both exemptions one and five encompass material that may be covered by executive
privilege. Thus, the limitation on in camera examination of documents within the scope
of the coverage of these two exemptions may be justified by considerations which would
be inapplicable to other exemptions. For example, the Court in Mink stated:
[he very purpose of the privilege, the encouragement of open expression of
opinion as to governmental policy is somewhat impaired by a requirement to sub-
mit the evidence even [in camera].
Id. at 92-93, quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp.
939, 947 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (opinion of retired Supreme Court Justice Reed). Cf. Epstein v.
Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 712-17
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
Since an in camera examination can violate the right to privacy, it may be argued
that some of the same principles which limit the use of in camera examinations under
exemptions one and five may extend to exemption six (personnel and medical files).
However, it has been held that exemption six imposes upon the courts a duty to balance
the right of privacy against the right of public access in specific cases. See text accom-
panying note 71 infra. The act of balancing requires an examination of the object to be
1975]
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an inspection is the sole means of achieving compliance with the stat-
utory mandate that disclosure of files should be denied where it "would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 4 Fur-
thermore, the majority's position regarding the status of a plaintiff is
consistent with substantial precedent. Although Judge Moore's opinion
is supported by a District of Columbia Circuit case,47 inquiry into a
plaintiff's status has been precluded by the Fourth48 and Sixth49 Cir-
studied. Thus, in Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshell, 280 F.2d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
a pre-FOIA subpoena case, the court stated that
where no military or state secrets are involved, and where the generally merito-
rious basis of the subpoena - including necessity - has been established, we think
it proper for the District judge to examine in camera the individual papers
which are alleged to be privileged and direct exclusions or excisions in a man-
ner deemed lawful and appropriate ....
In any event, Rose satisfies the Mink requirement in that the Air Force had been given
an opportunity to prove the applicability of exemptions without being immediately
compelled to produce the documents. See note 31 supra.
46 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(6) (1970). In order to balance the conflicting rights of the parties
to the litigation to determine the applicability of exemption six, the district court should
be permitted to examine the documents privately. The court cannot in the majority of
cases rule on the exempt nature of unseen documents. Furthermore, it would defeat the
purpose of the exemption to permit the court to examine the papers publicly. See Tax
Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (D.D.C. 1973).
47 Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J.). In balancing
the interests protected by exemption six, the Getman court examined into the nature
and extent of the invasion, the "public interest purpose" of the demandants, the quality
of any study to be performed, and the possibility that the study could be made without
use of the sought-after documents. Id.
In Getman, the demandants, labor law professors, requested the NLRB to provide
them with the names and addresses of employees eligible to vote in approximately 35
union representation elections. Id. at 671. The plaintiffs were conducting a study into
the NLRB's conduct of such elections and sought to interview consenting employees
about their attitudes toward the election. Id. at 671-72. The court noted that the in-
trusion involved was minor, that the employees had a right to refuse to participate, and
that there was a definite need for the study. Id. at 675-76. In reaching its conclusion, the
court stated:
[The invasion of employee privacy strikes us as very minimal, and the possible
detrimental effects of the study in terms of delaying the election process as
highly speculative. On the other hand, the study holds out an unusual promise.
rd. at 677. See also Wu v. National Endowment for the Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973). In addition to finding out that the documents
at issue were covered by exemption five, the court in Wu stated that "the services of
these [the Endowment's] outside experts clearly outweighs the public's interest in what-
ever factual excerpts there may be in the memoranda appellant seeks." Id. at 1034.
On the issue of consideration of a demandant's status, Getman does not represent
the unquestioned authority within its own circuit. In dicta, Chief Judge Bazelon in
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), said that "by directing disclosure to any
person, the Act precludes consideration of the interest of the party seeking relief." Id.
at 1077.
48 Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1973). The Robles court empha-
sized that disclosure was never to "depend upon the interest or lack of interest of the
party seeking disclosure." Id. at 847, quoting F. DAvis, ADMINISTRATwE LAw TEATsE,
§ 3A.4, at 120 (Supp. 1970).
49 Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972). Hawkes involved a defendant who
[Vol. 49:225
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1973 TERM
cuits, and three federal district court decisions.50
The Rose court also reversed the district court's determination
that the case summaries were covered by the exemption for documents
"solely related to the internal personnel rules and practices of the
agency." 51 In reaching its determination, the court was confronted with
a conflict in the legislative history as to the scope of the statutory
exemption. The Senate report of the Act construed the exemption
narrowly to exclude only routine ministerial rules from FOIA cover-
age. 2 The House report, however, adopted a more expansive approach
to the exemption, believing that it encompassed documents of a more
substantive nature.58 The House construction would exempt operating
rules and guidelines but would allow disclosure of routine adminis-
trative matters.54 In Rose, the Second Circuit failed, for the third
pleaded nolo contendere to criminal tax fraud and sought IRS documents relevant to
his case. The court therein stated:
Access to material under the Freedom of Information Act is not limited to those
with a particular reason seeking disclosure. Instead the material is available "to
any person."
Id. at 790 n.3 (citation omitted). The court further noted that "[s]uch exemptions as are
allowed in the Act are based on the nature of the material sought- not the identity of
the seeker." Id. at 792 n.6.
50Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,
363 F. Supp. 231, 234, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D.
DeL 1972); City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1971); cf. Con-
sumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796,
806 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
In Wine Hobby, the court, citing Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972), per-
mitted access to a list of names and addresses of registered private wine producers even
though the defendant was going to use the list to solicit business. 363 F. Supp. at 232,
234, 236. The court agreed with Judge MacKinnon's concurring opinion in Getman v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1971), that although Congress did not intend such
lists to be so freely available, it would take a congressional amendment to the FOIA to
prevent their release. 363 F. Supp. at 236-37.
The district judge in Williams stated that the FOIA
is a public disclosure statute giving "any person" a general right of access to
governmental records without references to his particular circumstances, his mo-
tive or his need.
345 F. Supp. at 594.
In City of Concord, the court indicated that
[t]he statute is so drafted that no "need to know" test is imposed upon the party
seeking information. Instead, information is to be made available to "the public"
or to "any person" requesting it.... [I]f plaintiffs are entitled to the documents
in question, then so is every member of the public.
333 F. Supp. at 959.
51495 F.2d at 266; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970).
52 [The exemption] relates only to the internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency. Examples of these may be rules as to personnel's use of parking fa-
cilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the
like.
S. REP., supra note 4, at 8.
53 The House report states that "[o]perating rules, guidelines, and manuals of pro-
cedure for Government investigators or examiners would be exempt from disclosure. ..
H.L. REx., supra note 3, at 10.
54 See id.
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time, 5 to select between these conflicting interpretations. Rather, the
court ruled that the case summaries were not exempt under either
interpretation.5l
The summaries were clearly nonexempt under the Senate con-
struction since they concerned more than mere ministerial matters.
The court noted that the summaries "have a substantial potential for
public interest outside the Government."5 7 Measuring the applicability
of the exemption, as construed by the Senate, by the amount of public
interest which the documents engender is a novel approach. Presum-
ably, the public interest would not be aroused by internal housekeep-
ing details, the type of material the Senate meant to exclude from the
FOIA.58 Moreover, the case summaries involved in Rose will substan-
55 See Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 818, 816 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1972) (Hays, J.); Polymers,
Inc. v. NLR.B, 414 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1969) (Timbers, J.), cert. denied, 896 US. 1010
(1970). In both of these earlier cases, the court indicated the existence of a conflict but
did not attempt to resolve it.
56 495 F.2d at 265. The Sixth Circuit has stated that the Senate report is to be pre-
ferred because it more clearly follows the "plain import" of the statute and because
using the House report could lead to conflicts with other sections of the Act. Hawkes v.
IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 796-97 (6th Cir. 1972). An additional reason for this preference is that
the Senate's report was available to both houses when they considered the bill, whereas
the House report was not issued until after the Senate had voted. Id. at 797.
Based on the same line of reasoning as the Sixth Circuit, two district courts have
placed their reliance on the Senate rather than the House report. Consumers Union of
the United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 801 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1863 (2d Cir. 1971); Benson v. General Services Ad-
ministration, 289 F. Supp. 590, 594-95 (W.D. Wash. 1968). Professor Davis also adopts
this rationale. See Davis, supra note 1, at 762-63. See also Project, Federal Administrative
Law Developments -1969, 1970 Dunn L.J. 67, 81; Shredding the Paper Curtain, supra
note 1, at 716-17. However, the Second Circuit has refused to fully accept the argument
that the Senate report should be preferred merely because it alone was before both
houses of Congress. According to the court, this approach may have merit in "isolated
instances dealing with specific provisions," but both reports reflect the purpose of the
Act. Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 816 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972) (Hays, J.).
57 495 F.2d at 265.
While never mentioned in the case, it is interesting to consider whether the wide-
spread and generally adverse public reaction to a related incident had any impact on the
court's decision. A West Point cadet had been found guilty of an honor code violation
and the Honor Committee asked for his resignation. Rather than resign, the cadet suc-
cessfully appealed to a Board of Officers on what his peers felt were technical grounds.
He spent his next nineteen months at West Point "silenced," i.e., no member of the
Corps of Cadets would speak to him except in an official capacity. Since this punishment
is an unofficial part of the operation of the honor code disciplinary system, there was
strong public reaction in favor of the cadet and against the disciplinary system. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, July 13, 1978, § 1, at 41, col. 1.
58 The fact that a substantial public interest has been aroused should not, in itself,
serve to strip an otherwise exempted document of its protection. See Polymers, Inc v.
NLRB, 414 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1969), wherein the Second Circuit held that an NLRB
document entitled A Guide to the Conduct of Elections, while of substantial public in-
terest, was exempt from disclosure under the internal personnel rules exemption of the
FOIA. Accord, Hicks v. Freeman, 397 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 893 Us.
1064 (1969) (Dep't of Agriculture reduction-in-force procedure); City of Concord v. Am-
brose, 853 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (Treasury Dep't instructions for proper conduct
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dally affect the careers and lives of the disciplined cadets 9 Such an
important impact further serves to distinguish the documents from
minor administrative matters.
The court interpreted the House report as requiring disclosure
unless the sanctity of the administrative processes would be threatened
by release.:0 The Air Force argued that publication of the summaries
would weaken the confidentiality of the disciplinary process and thereby
shatter the foundation of the honor code. The agency further con-
tended that the editing process could not "totally succeed" and that
an inadvertent disclosure might occur.61 The court rejected these ar-
guments, stating that the editing process would adequately protect
the confidentiality of the honor code proceedings.6 2 The court also
noted that total success was "an impossible standard and surely not
one imposed by a statute based upon a general philosophy of full
agency disclosure to the public. '63
The court's ruling on the internal personnel rules exemption is
consistent with the remedial intent of the legislation. As previously
noted, it is well established that the exemptions from the FOIA are
to be narrowly construed and that disclosure is to be favored." It
is unfortunate, however, that the panel refused to indicate a prefer-
ence for either of the contradictory congressional interpretations. Al-
of a stakeout) (dictum); Pifer v. Laird, 328 F. Supp. 649 (ND. Cal. 1971) (procedures in-
volving conscientious objector discharges). See also H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 10; Hear-
ings on H.R. 5012 et al., before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Op-
erations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1969).
Rose involved more than mere public interest; at stake were substantial rights of
the disciplined cadets. This additional circumstance removes Rose from the Polymers
line of cases.
59 495 F.2d at 265.
60 Id. In reaching this interpretation of the House report, the court cited Tietze v.
Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 610 (S.D. Tex. 1972), Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C.
1972), remanded sub nom. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and City
of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1971). 495 F.2d at 265 n.12. Although
both Tietze and Cuneo involved material exempt under the internal personnel rules
provision, neither case mentioned or cited the House report. In City of Concord, the
court stated in dicta that the House report might be viewed as authorizing the with-
holding of instructions relating to the operation of a stakeout. However, the court de-
dined to base its holding on that ground. 333 F. Supp. 460-61. Thus, the Rose interpre-
tation of the House report must be viewed as tenuous at best.
The court's refusal to exempt the case summaries on the basis of the House report
can be substantiated on another ground. The report would exempt operating rules and
manuals of procedure, but not matters relating to internal management, such as em-
ployee relations. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 10, quoted by the court at 495 F.2d at 264-
65. Summaries of disciplinary cases would fall into the internal management category
and thus would not be exempt from FOIA coverage.
01495 F.2d at 266.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See notes 7 9: 23 and accompanying text supra.
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though the court was able to conclude that the materials involved
were not covered by either interpretation, Rose will offer little guid-
ance to future litigants confronted with a direct conflict in the legis-
lative history.
In resolving the final issue raised, Rose held that courts do not
have the equitable power to refrain from ordering disclosure of ma-
terials where such documents are not covered by one of the statutory
exemptions.6 5 The court rejected the Air Force's argument that the
courts could withhold documents whose release would damage the
public interest. In his opinion, Judge Feinberg indicated that exercise
of equitable discretion would only be proper in a "truly exceptional
case." 66
This holding finds justification in the Act itself, which provides
that the withholding of information is not authorized "except as spe-
cifically stated in this section." 67 Furthermore, the Second Circuit's
position is supported by persuasive case law. In Soucie v. David,68 the
District of Columbia Circuit took cognizance of the legislative bal-
ancing of interests inherent in the statutory exemptions and stated in
dicta:
Since judicial use of traditional equitable principles to prevent
disclosure would upset this legislative resolution of conflicting
interests, we are persuaded that Congress did not intend to confer
on district courts a general power to deny relief on equitable
grounds apart from the exemptions in the Act itself.69
This reasoning was accepted by the same circuit in Getman v. NLRB.70
The Getman court ruled that while the personal privacy exemption re-
quired the exercise of judicial discretion, "equitable discretion should
not be imported into any of the other exemptions."7 1 The Second
Circuit in Rose allied itself with the position established by Soucie
and Getman.7 2
In accord with the Second Circuit's view, both the Fourth73 and
65 495 F.2d at 269-70.
66 Id. at 269.
675 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
6s 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J.).
69 Id. at 1077.
70450 F.2d 670, 678, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1971); accord, Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Re-
negotiation Board, 466 F.2d 345, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
71450 F.2d at 674 n.10. This language was quoted by the Rose court. 495 F.2d at
269-70.
72495 F.2d at 269-70.
73 Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973), wherein the court rejected an
argument that disclosure should be refused because release "would do more harm than
good." Cf. Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971). In Wellford, the court stated:
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Sixth74 Circuits have concluded that the FOIA conveyed no equitable
discretion to the courts to refuse disclosure. To the contrary, the Ninth
Circuit 5 and two district courts76 have interpreted the FOIA as per-
mitting the use of judicial discretion.77 As the Sixth Circuit has pointed
out, however, the use of such equitable power would result in a dis-
trict court being able to rule on disclosure without being bound by the
statutory scheme established in the FOIA.78 Such a result would be
clearly contrary to congressional intent.
After considering voluminous testimony on both sides and balancing the public,
private and administrative interests, Congress decided that the best course was
open access to the governmental process with a very few exceptions. It is not the
province of the courts to restrict that legislative judgment under the guise of ju-
dicially balancing the same interests that Congress considered.
Id. at 24-25.
74 Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792 n.6 (6th Cir. 1972); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc.
v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661-62 (6th Cir. 1972).
75 GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). In Benson, the court noted that in
exercising the equity powers "conferred" by the FOIA, it must weigh the effects of dis-
closure by use of traditional equitable principles. Id. at 880. However, as the District of
Columbia Circuit pointed out in Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 678 n25 (D.C. Cir.
1971), Benson can be distinguished since it involved the applicability of exemption five.
This exemption covers material which is unavailable to a nonagency party in litigation
with an agency. Thus, the issue may permissibly turn on the equitable considerations
underlining a potential ruling on discovery. Secondly, in Benson the agency had, by
regulation, bound itself not to use the exemption unless there was a "compelling need."
Id. This concept also imports equitable considerations.
Benson is supported by the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Wu v. National Endow-
ment for the Humanities, 460 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir, 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973).
In that case, the court found not only that exemption five applied, but that equities
running in favor of the agency would serve to prevent disclosure of the contested docu-
ments. Id. at 1034; see note 47 supra.
76 Cuneo v. Laird, 538 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1972) (Hart, J.), remanded sub nom.
Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Consumers Union, Inc. v. Veterans
Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363
(2d Cir. 1971).
In Cuneo, the district court ruled that requiring the Government to publicly dis-
close its defense procurement auditing manual would be comparable to forcing a foot-
ball team to reveal its "playbook." Cuneo has little precedential value in view of strong .
District of Columbia Circuit authority to the contrary. See text accompanying note 72
supra.
In Consumers Union, the court stated that if agency records are not exempted un-
der the statutory formulations, "a court must order their disclosure unless the agency
proves that disclosure will result in significantly greater harm than good." 310 F. Supp.
at 806. But see note 73 supra. Consumers Union was one of the earlier FOIA cases and,
like Cuneo, has been vitiated by subsequent judicial interpretations.
77 The House report provides some support for this proposition. It states:
The court will have authority whenever it considers such action equitable and
appropriate to enjoin the agency from withholding its records and to order the
production of agency records improperly withheld.
H.IR REP., supra note 3, at 9 (emphasis added). Professor Davis also believes that the
FOIA conveys discretion to the courts in ruling on disclosure. See Davis, supra note 1,
at 767.
78Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. Federal Housing Administration, 464 F.2d 657
(6th Cir. 1972). In Tennessean, the court rejected the idea that
the District Court had the right to disregard the purposes and limitations of
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In Rose, the Second Circuit kept faith with the tenor of the
FOIA. By directing the district court to employ an in camera exam-
ination, the court was able to authorize the release of the case sum-
maries, while simultaneously guarding against unwarranted invasions
of privacy. The panel's rejection of the applicability of the internal
personnel rules exemption prevented the use of that exemption to
cover the case summaries, which clearly are matters of substantive
policy. However, the court's failure to explicitly endorse the Senate
report's interpretation of the scope of the exemption over that of
the House leaves the door open to future litigation.79 Finally, by its
holding that the FOIA generally does not import any equitable dis-
cretion to the courts, the Second Circuit properly refused to judicially
engraft another "exemption" onto the framework supplied by Con-
gress.80
Gary A. Manso
[the FOIA] any more than did the agency.... Such a view, [that the courts have
such equity power] carried to its logical conclusion, would allow the District
Court to review a petition for disclosure totally independent of the Freedom of
Information Act and its purposes and standards.
Id. at 661.
79 Agencies desiring to withhold information either permanently or temporarily may
well be encouraged to litigate based upon real or imagined differences in the legislative
history of the FOIA. It is submitted, however, that Rose serves to provide the Second
Circuit's definition of the Act's thrust. Implicit in the court's holding is the notion that
it will give little weight to arguments based upon a portion of the legislative history
where these arguments fail to conform to the court's definition of the rights and pre-
sumptions created by the FOIA.
80 Subsequent to Rose, Congress, over a presidential veto, enacted broad and sweeping
amendments to the FOIA. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502. In further emphasiz-
ing and strengthening the FOIA's mandate of disclosure, the recent legislation adds cre-
dence to the majority opinion in Rose. In particular, specific authorization is provided
for in camera inspection by the court to determine the applicability of any of the exemp-
tions. Id. § 1(b)(2), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). This portion of the amendment, by
providing for in camera review under any subsection (b) exemption, overrules the Su-
preme Court's decision in Mink. Thus, even where the agency contends that either the
military or diplomatic secrets exemption or the interagency memorandum exemption ap-
plies, see note 8 supra, the court may require production of the documents for in camera
examination. See note 45 supra.
The FOIA amendments also attempt to curb the use of unwarranted "stalling" tac-
tics by an agency once an appropriate request has been made. See notes 13, 39, 79 and
accompanying text supra. Towards this end, the new provisions establish specific time
limits for agency determinations, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 1(c), codified
as 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A), (B), empower the court to award attorney fees to successful
complainants, id. § 1(b)(2), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), and create a procedure for
disciplining culpable agency personnel, id., codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F).
As Senator Mondale stated during the Senate debate which resulted in enactment of
the amendments: "The Freedom of Information Act amendments of 1974 are an attempt
to improve compliance with the act, which is needed to make it a better vehicle for learn-
ing the truth." 120 CONG. RE. 19,820 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974). Judicial decisions such as
the Second Circuit's in Rose serve to accomplish this same aim. Hopefully, the Supreme
Court, which has recently indicated that it will review Rose, will adopt an equally en-
lightened approach. See 43 U.S.L.W. 3445 (U.S. Feb. 14, 1975) (No. 74-489) (writ of cer-
tiorari granted).
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